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Dissension among the North Korean, Soviet and Chinese Communists over Policy in Korea

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
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- Pro-Soviet North Korean Communists are attempting to get Korean policy under Soviet control. They queried the Soviets on the status of the Chinese Communists in Korea, wanting to know whether the Chinese Communists were volunteers or regulars, since the Chinese Communist "Volunteers" in Korea were supposedly under North Korean Army jurisdiction. According to public opinion in North Korea, the entry of European troops is a step nearer Soviet intervention and World War III. North Korean Labor Party officials have openly stated that the Communists should make peace among themselves before holding peace talks with the United Nations. This feeling is strongly supported. Anti-Soviet Communists in Korea may make an attempt to contact the United Nations for the peaceful unification of Korea. This act would be genuine so far as anti-Soviet Koreans are concerned.
- The Chinese Communists are displeased with the entry of European volunteers in North Korea. The reason for their displeasure is that the Soviet and North Korean Communist parties without Chinese Communist consent requested the assistance of the European Cominform countries with the objective of placing North Korea under the control of Soviet-trained Koreans. By this act the Soviets were trying to block the Chinese Communists from monopolizing the Korean conflict for Chinese Co munist benefit. If European troops take part in the fighting, the Soviets believe the problem will be partially solved. The Soviets and North Koreans both feel that the entrance of the Europeans is sufficient reason for setting up an international joint command in Korea, thus depriving the Chinese Communists of the authority to make or dictate decisions in North Korea. The establishment of this international command was under discussion in late August. Russian army officers are to be in command.



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- The Chinese Communists assert that the problem in Korea is lack of equipment, not manpower. The Chinese Communists fear that the Soviets will use the above tactics everywhere in Asia to thwart the advancement of the Chinese Communists.
- Moderate North Korean Communists are disgusted with the establishment of the joint Soviet-Chinese Communist political mission on the truce talks, from which the North Korean delegates take orders; the moderates view this as evidence of Soviet and Chinese Communist domination, and blame KIM II-song for selling out, saying he agreed to the joint mission at a Communist meeting at Peiping. KIM answers that this is a new step for organizing collective security forces in Asia and that the joint commission was part of a decision made at a general meeting of the Asian Cominform.
- The North Koreans are not willing to resume peace negotiations at Kaesong, and insist that the North Korean Communists should have the deciding voice in the Korean theater and in political talks. The North Korean Labor Party held a special meeting in late August on this question and decided to open separate negotiations with the Soviets in Moscow and with the Chinese Communists in Peiping.

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